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VI. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND THE FEDERAL RULES*
A. Introduction
Application of evidentiary rules to electronic information is not
as controversial as other aspects of electronic discovery.
Nevertheless, as the following Section demonstrates, it is an evolving
and complex area of the law. Federal courts apply the Rules in
virtually the same way as non-electronic, "hard copy" evidence.
However, there are applications of the Rules that are relatively
untested, and courts are hesitant to admit as evidence any electronic
information that can be manipulated or falsified. As technology
evolves, and as federal courts become more facile in handling
electronic evidence, the Rules as they currently exist may not be able
to keep pace with these developments.
Yet, amended or not, the Federal Rules of Evidence' will
continue to be a significant hurdle to the use of electronic
information in litigation. Though the Rules do not come into play
until after litigants obtain discovery, the Rules can-and should-
inform the entire discovery process. For instance, although litigants
can rely on an increasingly wide range of digital and electronic
information, not all types of evidence are treated the same under the
Federal Rules. Thus, the use of electronic evidence in federal courts
raises another series of practical challenges.
Electronic evidence can be a litigant's best friend or worst
nightmare, depending on the type of evidence, how it is used, and in
what court it is offered. During the latter half of the twentieth
* Leah Voigt Romano: J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles; M.P.H., University of Michigan, April 2003; B.A., Biology and
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1. All references to rules are to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FED. R.
EvID.)
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century, courts quickly recognized the admissibility of computer-
based business and public records. 2  In fact, some courts have
concluded that "computer evidence is not intrinsically unreliable,"
3
and they have become relatively adept at dealing with the complexity
of electronic and digital evidence. However, courts have not
categorically accepted this form of evidence. In particular, they are
wary of technologies, like the Internet, which can be accessed and
manipulated by a wide range of users. At least one court has
remarked that Internet-based evidence is "inherently
untrustworthy.
' 4
Today, courts consider highly sophisticated digital and
electronic evidence, from global positioning satellite tracking data to
electronic tollbooth records.5 As electronic evidence proliferates and
grows increasingly complex, federal courts might be more skeptical
of its use and origins. Alternatively, courts may continue to take the
"more relaxed view" and apply the Rules much as they would for
any other form of evidence. 6 Whichever approach the courts follow,
2. See United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that computer records of a bankrupt corporation were admissible
because the corporation's bookkeeper testified that she input sales, inventory
and payroll information on a regular basis and that the printout accurately
reflected that information); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that testimony of the comptroller of a bankrupt company was
sufficient to establish authenticity of computer records).
3. United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1982) (records of phone
company's computerized billing process); see also Brown v. Town of Chapel
Hill, 79 F.3d 1141 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 1996) (unpublished), available at 1996
WL 119932, at *2) (computer printouts of memoranda from town's personnel
and transportation departments); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 216 (9th
Cir. 1989) (computer record of a telephone call to a hotel room); United States
v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 1364-65 (7th Cir. 1984) (computer records from
university's payroll system); United States v. Young Bros., 728 F.2d 682, 693-
94 (5th Cir. 1984) (state's computer records).
4. St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (referring to information taken from the Worldwide Web).
5. See United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing
the admissibility of a customs officer's testimony about global positioning
satellite data); see also Tresa Baldas, New Data Used as Evidence:
Surveillance with Toll Booth and Cellphone Data Is on the Rise, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 16, 2004, at 1 (describing new forms of electronic evidence "popping up
in courtrooms nationwide").
6. See Thomas J. Casamassima & Edmund V. Caplicki III, Electronic
Evidence at Trial: The Admissibility of Project Records, E-Mail, and Internet
Websites, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Summer 2003, at 13-14 (stating that most
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the Federal Rules will undoubtedly play an integral role in shaping
both discovery and admissibility.
7
This Section describes recent developments in admissibility of
computer generated, electronic, and digital evidence.8 Litigants must
anticipate three important obstacles to the admission of electronic
evidence. 9 Part B explores the first hurdle of authentication. Before
electronic discovery may be admitted into evidence, its proponent'
°
must provide "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what its proponent claims."' " As with other forms of
evidence, authenticity of electronic evidence can be proven in a
variety of ways.
After proving authenticity, a party offering electronic evidence
might have to overcome the hearsay barrier. Part C focuses on
courts find the foundation requirement for computer records is the same as that
required for other business records); see also Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer
Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 956, 963-64 (1986) (noting that,
in the context of computerized business records, courts have relaxed conditions
of trustworthiness "in deference to the exigencies of modem business practices
and the desire for an efficient trial process").
7. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in both civil and criminal actions.
Generally, federal courts treat a particular type of electronic evidence, such as
public business records, the same in both criminal and civil contexts.
However, the predominant type of electronic evidence used in each context
differs. For instance, in cases involving illegal transmission of data over the
Internet or via e-mail, prosecutors rely more heavily on computer forensic
examinations, while civil litigators are more likely to present electronic
evidence derived from business records. Nevertheless, there are no hard and
fast rules for what types of electronic evidence can or should be used in
criminal or civil cases. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc., v. Lozen Int'l, LLC,
285 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing the use of an e-mail message
as an "adoptive admission" where one employee authored and forwarded a
message to a co-worker who then proceeded to copy the message's contents
and add a preface); United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir.
2001) (using public agency records in criminal prosecution).
8. These terms are used interchangeably to refer to evidence that is"'electronic."
9. For an excellent overview of the admissibility of electronically stored
evidence in both state and federal courts, see J. Shane Givens, Comment, The
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence at Trial: Courtroom Admissibility
Standards, 34 CUMB. L. REv. 95 (2003-2004).
10. For the purposes of this Section, "litigant" refers broadly to any party to
a lawsuit, whereas "proponent" refers specifically to the party seeking to admit
an item of evidence.
11. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
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computerized private business records, while Part D highlights the
admission of electronically stored public documents. Both types of
records can fit squarely within an exception to the hearsay rule. 12
However, as described in Part E, problems arise when this rule is
applied to e-mail messages and evidence obtained from the
Internet. 13
Finally, a party sometimes has to contend with a third barrier-
the best evidence rule. 14 Part F discusses how this rule might be
applied to electronically stored evidence. In general, the rule is a
relatively low hurdle because printouts of data stored in electronic or
digital format are usually admissible as "originals."' 15 However, in
cases where data must be manipulated before it can be used as
evidence, the best evidence rule may pose a challenge.
B. Foundations for Electronic Evidence: Authentication
Electronic evidence is created "whenever a person enters
information into a computer, a computer generates information in
response to a request by an operator, or a computer uses or processes
information."' 16  Unlike other forms of real evidence, electronic
evidence can be created almost instantaneously, with a few rapid
keystrokes or with no human input at all. Each day, people and
computers generate countless bits of electronic information that can
potentially be used as evidence. As a result, electronic evidence is
virtually everywhere.
12. See id. 803(6).
13. For instance, an .html posting on a website is considered "Internet
evidence."
14. When a party seeks to prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph-that is, what a writings "says" or what a picture "shows"--the
best evidence rule requires that the party provide the court with the original
writing, recording, or photograph. Id. 1002 (Requirement of Original); Id.
1001 (Definitions).
15. See Casamassima & Caplicki, supra note 6, at 16.
16. Christine Sgarlata Chung & David J. Byer, The Electronic Paper Trail:
Evidentiary Obstacles to Discovery and Admission of Electronic Evidence, 4
B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 5, 8 (1998). Common or traditional forms of electronic
evidence include databases, operating systems, software programs, electronic
messages, and computer generated models or images. Id.
1748
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The first hurdle to the admission of any real evidence is
authentication. 1 7 Unless a party shows that the evidence is what that
party claims it to be, the court will view the evidence as irrelevant.'
8
Thus, a proponent must prove authenticity before the factfinder will
be permitted to consider the evidence. Fortunately (for the
proponent), this hurdle remains relatively low: a proponent need
only present "evidence sufficient to support a finding" of
authentication or identification. 19 By way of illustration, Federal
Rule of Evidence 901(b) provides different methods by which the
proponent may satisfy this requirement. 20 This is not an exclusive
list, and a proponent is not limited to only one method of
authentication.
2
In addition, the Rule is intended to "guide and suggest, leaving
room for growth and development in this area of the law.' 2 2
Notably, in 1972, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee recognized
that electronic processes or systems 23 and "data stored in computers
and similar methods" 24 play an important role in the authentication of
real evidence. With this flexibility, proponents can cobble together
17. FED. R. EvID. 901(a) states that the requirement of authentication or
identification is a condition precedent to admissibility.
18. United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Hemandez-Herrera, 952 F.2d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1991)
("The rationale for the authentication requirement is that the evidence is
viewed as irrelevant unless the proponent of the evidence can show that the
evidence is what its proponent claims."). According to the Advisory
Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence, authentication is therefore "a
special aspect of relevancy." FED. R. EviD. 901 (a) advisory committee's note.
19. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). Nevertheless, "the need for suitable methods of
proof still remains, since... unforeseen contingencies may arise, and cases of
genuine controversy will still occur." Id. 901(a) advisory committee's note; see
also United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The
government made a prima facie showing of authenticity because it presented
evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find that the chat room log
printouts were authenticated.").
20. FED. R. EvID. 901(b) (e.g., testimony of a witness with knowledge;
nonexpert opinion on handwriting; distinctive characteristics and the like;
voice identification; public records or reports).
21. Id. 901 (b) advisory committee's note.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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more than one of these methods to prove the authenticity of
electronic evidence.
25
1. Authentication of Business Records
Since the second half of the twentieth century, courts have
recognized the evidentiary role of private, computer generated
business records. Some courts have required a more extensive
foundation for computer records than for other conventional forms of
evidence. 26  For instance, in the 1977 case of United States v.
Scholle,27 the Eighth Circuit held that a proponent must identify the
"original source of the computer program... and the procedures for
input control including tests used to assure accuracy and
reliability." 28 But since then, courts have declined to follow the
Eighth Circuit's lead and instead have shown little hesitancy in
accepting computer technology and its inherent lack of human
control.2 9 For instance, in United States v. Vela,3° the Fifth Circuit
set the pace with the generally accepted notion that computer
evidence is as reliable as other forms of real evidence. 31 Despite
Scholle's suggestion that computer records should be subject to
unique foundational requirements, 32 the Fifth Circuit reiterated its
previous holding that "computer data compilations.., should be
25. See, e.g., United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000)
(relying on computer printouts, notes made by the defendant, and co-
conspirator testimony to authenticate chat room discussions between the
defendant and a federal agent); United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318,
1322-23 (lth Cir. 2000) (concluding that an e-mail message was
authenticated with circumstantial evidence).
26. See United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1988); Rosenberg
v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d
889 (9th Cir. 1969); Chung & Byer, supra note 16, at 41.
27. 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977).
28. Id. at 1125.
29. See, e.g., Catabran, 836 F.2d at 457 ("The use of a computer to create
the ledger does not change the result."); Rosenberg, 624 F.2d at 665 (5th Cir.
1982) (supporting the admissibility of computerized business records); United
States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that computer evidence
can be reliable).
30. 673 F.2d 86.
31. Id. at 90.
32. Id.
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treated as any other record of regularly conducted activity."33 Thus,
when a court considers authenticity, any inaccuracy or material
alteration in the electronic record involves the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility.
34
Today, courts differ in their application of the foundational
requirements for electronic evidence. In one line of cases, courts
first consider whether electronic evidence has been properly
authenticated under Rule 901. 35  For this purpose, courts treat
computerized business records the same as records kept in a
company's books, 36 and the methods of authentication are generally
the same.37 After finding that electronic evidence has been properly
authenticated, a court will next consider whether the evidence
constitutes hearsay, and, if so, whether it may nevertheless be
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, i.e., the business
38records exception under Rule 803(6). In a second line of cases,
courts have sidestepped an explicit authentication analysis and have
33. Id.; Rosenberg, 624 F.2d at 665. The Fifth Circuit also accepted the
district court's statement that computerized telephone bills are "even more
reliable than... average business record[s] because they are not even touched
by the hand of man." Vela, 673 F.2d at 90.
34. Both federal courts and the Advisory Committee of the Federal Rules
follow this general rule. See, e.g., United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177,
1180-81 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving public records); United States v. Tank,
200 F.3d 627, 629-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (involving an investigation of chat room
logs in a criminal case); Catabran, 836 F.2d at 456-58 (9th Cir. 1988)
(involving private business records). The reader should bear in mind that this
general rule does not apply when courts focus on the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. In such a case, the requirement of
trustworthiness may preclude an electronic record that bears an inaccuracy or
is subject to manipulability. See infra Part VI.C.2.c (discussing the
trustworthiness requirement for the business records exception).
35. See infra Parts VI.B.l.a-b, B.2.b (discussing authentication of private
and public business records and recovered electronic data).
36. See Catabran, 836 F.2d at 457 ("'[I]t is immaterial that the business
record is maintained in a computer rather than in company books' assuming
that the proponent lays a proper foundation."); United States v. De Georgia,
420 F.2d 889, 893 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1969); infra Part VI.C. 1.
37. See Stanley A. Kurzban, Authentication of Computer-Generated
Evidence in the United States Federal Courts, 35 IDEA 437, 439-40 (1995)
(stating that authentication of computer generated evidence has been governed
by principles and rules of evidence that existed before computer usage became
widespread and that application of rules "requires analogizing computer-
related processes to those that pre-dated the computer's invention").
38. E.g., Catabran, 836 F.2d at 457.
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focused instead on the business records exception to the hearsay
rule.39 As discussed below, proponents may be able to satisfy both
authentication and the hearsay exception by meeting the
requirements of the latter.4°
a. Private business records and witness testimony
To prove authenticity, proponents often use the testimony of a
witness with knowledge. This method of authentication
"contemplates a broad spectrum [including] ... testimony of a
witness who was present at the signing of a document .... ,42 For
electronic evidence, courts accept witness testimony that the
computer generated documents are records that were produced and
maintained in the regular course of business.43 In United States v.
Catabran,44 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court properly
admitted computerized ledgers and inventories when one of the
company's bookkeepers testified that she input sales, inventory, and
payroll information on a regular basis and that the printout of those
records accurately displayed the information.4 5 Similarly, in United
39. See infra Parts VI.C-D. This hearsay exception may incorporate the
authenticity requirement because one prong of the "test" is the trustworthiness
of evidence. Gregory P. Joseph, Internet Evidence II, NAT'L L.J., July 30,
2001, at B10; see, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting that even if Web postings qualified as "business records," they
lacked trustworthiness); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that computer data compilations "should be treated as any other
record of regularly conducted activity" and hence, subject to the business
records exception to the hearsay rule).
40. See infra notes 180-192 and accompanying text.
41. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(l); United States v. Henry, 164 F.3d 1304,
1309 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Rule 901 (b)(1) provides that a witness with knowledge
may authenticate evidence by testifying that a matter is what it is claimed it
be."); United States v. Hemandez-Herrera, 952 F.2d 342, 343 (10th Cir.
1991)).
42. FED. R. EvID. 901 advisory committee's note.
43. See infra Part VI.C.2 for a discussion of the business records exception
to the hearsay rule.
44. 836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1988).
45. Id. at 457. Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that the qualified
witness laid the foundation required by Rule 803(6), this also would satisfy the
requirement of authentication because the proponent demonstrated that this
was a witness with knowledge. See id. at 458. For a discussion of how courts
apply the hearsay rule as the foundational requirement for electronic evidence,
see infra Parts VI.C-D, E. 1.b.
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States v. Linn,46 the Ninth Circuit held that testimony of the hotel's
director of communications, who was on duty when a computer
record was printed, provided a sufficient foundation for the record.47
Other circuits have adopted a similar analysis, requiring that the
witness be able to identify the records and their purpose. In Zayre
Corp. v. S.M. & R. Co.,48 the Seventh Circuit distinguished between
the affidavit of Zayre's controller, which was insufficient to
authenticate computer invoices, and the controller's testimony,
which was sufficient to establish his knowledge about the printouts
in question.49 Specifically, "[t]he affidavit state[d] nothing about
why [the controller] would be familiar with the computer system and
data processing procedures that produced the printouts.,
50
Moreover, without such knowledge, the witness's title of "controller"
was "meaningless" to support authentication. 51 On the other hand,
the court noted that the controller's testimony did support
authentication because he indicated that he reviewed the printouts
and that they accurately reflected the amount in dispute.
52
Similarly, in Hardison v. Balboa Insurance Co., 5 the Tenth
Circuit held that company employees properly authenticated
computer generated copies of cancellation notices by identifying
them as records produced and maintained in the regular course of
business. 54 In that case, an insurance company offered electronic
evidence to prove that it cancelled plaintiff's policy before a tornado
struck her home.55  The company's Vice President of Tracking
Operations explained in his affidavit how the records were processed
46. 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 216.
48. 882 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989).
49. Id. at 1149-50. The court's discussion here is dicta. Id. at 1150.
Although the court analyzed authentication in some detail, it did not make a
formal ruling on the issue because the defendant failed to raise the objection at
trial. Id.
50. Id. at 1149.
51. Id.; see also Kurzban, supra note 37, at 443 (stating that "[s]uccessful
challenges to witnesses' qualifications have all involved witnesses who were
ignorant of the procedures involved in the processing of the records they were
authenticating.").
52. Zayre, 882 F.2d at 1149. In addition, the opposing party failed to call
the witness's knowledge into question. Id.
53. 4 Fed. Appx. 663 (10th Cir. 2001).
54. Id. at 669-70.
55. Id. at 665, 669.
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and maintained.56  In addition, answers to the plaintiffs
interrogatories provided detailed information about the company's
computerized record keeping system. 57 As Rule 90158 and the above
cases demonstrate, a proponent does not need detailed or highly
technical testimony to authenticate an electronic record.
b. Public records or reports
At least one court has recognized that 5public records may also
be authenticated with witness testimony. In United States v.
Meienberg,60 the Tenth Circuit held that printouts of records kept by
the Colorado Bureau of Investigation were properly certified and
61authenticated under Rule 901(b)(7). Quoting the Advisory
Committee, the court noted that "[p]ublic records are regularly
authenticated by proof of custody, without more.' 62 In this case, the
defendant was convicted of selling a firearm in violation of federal
and state law.6 3 To show that the defendant failed to contact the
Bureau for a background check on potential customers and instead
recorded phony approval numbers, the government introduced
printouts of computerized records with the approval numbers issued
by the Bureau.64
The defendant argued that the government did not authenticate
the evidence because its witness did not verify the accuracy of the
56. 1d. at 669.
57. Id. Two of the company's employees verified the answers. Id.
58. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59. United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001). To
date, no other federal appellate court has considered an objection to the
admission of electronic evidence under Rule 901(b)(7). Nonetheless, this rule
has been used in a variety of other cases involving public records. See United
States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 952 F.2d 342, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1991)
(Immigration and Naturalization Service records); United States v. Williams,
No. 90-5731, 1991 WL 199870, at *11 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1991) (unpublished
opinion) (certified copy of military pay, leave and earnings statements); Vote
v. United States, No. 90-16116, 1991 WL 5487, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 1991)
(unpublished opinion) (IRS Certificates of Assessment and Payment); United
States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (5th Cir. 1985) (INS record of
deportation).
60. 263 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2001).
61. Id. at 1181.
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 1179.
64. Id. at 1180.
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printouts.65 The court disagreed, however, because testimony that
the computer printouts reflected the Bureau's record of approval
numbers assigned to the defendant's business was "evidence
sufficient to support a finding" of the records' 
authenticity.66
Moreover, the court noted that public records, including data
compilations under Rule 901(b)(7), can be authenticated by
testimony that the record "is from the public office where items of
this nature are kept."
67
Public records or reports may also be self-authenticating under
Rule 902. Under subsection four of the Rule, copies of public
records, "including data compilations in any form," are self-
authenticating if they are certified as correct by a "custodian or
[an]other person authorized to make the certification.
68 In federal
litigation, the most common public records are tax documents
offered by the government to prove tax evasion.6
9 In many cases,
courts have found that computerized tax records are self-
authenticating.7 0  For instance, in United States v. Ryan,
7 1 the
Seventh Circuit held that the government laid a proper foundation for
the admission of certified computer records of the United States
Treasury Department, which showed that the defendant failed to file
his income tax returns. 72 Likewise, a court in the Southern District
of California held in United States v. Boyce
73 that income tax
assessment forms certified by an authorized person were self-
authenticating even though they were generated exclusively for
65. Id. at 1181.
66. Id.; FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
67. Meienberg, 263 F.3d at 1181; FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(7).
68. FED. R. EvID. 902(4).
69. While tax records are the most common self-authenticating public
records, courts have considered other types of records. For example, in United
States v. Darveaux, 830 F.2d 124, 125-26 (8th Cir. 1987), the Eighth Circuit
ruled that copies of a prior conviction were properly authenticated by the
signature of the district court clerk and the seal of the Texas Department of
Corrections.
70. E.g., United States v. Gabel, No. C98-04241 SBA, 2002 WL 1396782,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2002); United States v. Thurner, 21 Fed. Appx. 477,
478-79 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bisbee, 245 F.3d 1001, 1006-07 (8th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Ryan, 969 F.2d 238, 239-40 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Boyce, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
71. 969 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1992).
72. Id. at 240.
73. 148 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
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litigation purposes.74 And, in United States v. Bisbee,75 the Eighth
Circuit held that IRS records of a trust fund penalty assessment,
along with a certificate attesting to their authenticity, were
admissible under Rule 902.76
2. Electronic Forensics
77
In criminal cases, 78 or in cases where electronic files have been
deleted or destroyed,79 parties can use recovery programs and other
forensic techniques to capture data that otherwise would be
inaccessible to the average computer user. In addition to the
foundational requirements discussed above, courts may impose "best
practices" and rules regarding expert testimony to control the
admissibility of forensic evidence. Although such requirements have
been enforced in only a few reported cases, judges are increasingly
sophisticated when it comes to their knowledge and analysis of
forensic technology.80 As such, more courts may hold proponents of
electronic evidence to high technical standards.
74. Id. at 1082. The court held the records were authenticated under Rule
902 (1), domestic public documents under seal. Id. This rule provides that a
document bearing a seal of the agency and a signature purporting to be an
attestation or execution thereof satisfies the condition of authenticity. FED. R.
EvID. 902(1). The court also held that these records were admissible under the
public records exception to the hearsay rule 803(8). Boyce, 148 F. Supp. at
1082; see also infra Part VI.D (discussing in detail the admissibility of public
business records).
75. 245 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2001).
76. Id. at 1006-07. In this case, the records were also authenticated under
seal of the United States and by signature of attestation. Id. at 1006.
77. An entire industry is devoted to providing practitioners and clients with
tools for electronic discovery and computer forensics. For an example, visit
http://www.krollontrack.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
78. See infra notes 92-97, 103-106 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
80. Some district courts have handled electronic evidence with a
remarkably high degree of technical knowledge. For instance, in Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 305-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
Judge Kaplan devoted an entire section of his opinion to explaining the process
of digital encryption and decompression used to reproduce movies on digital
versatile disks, or DVDs.
1756
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a. Best practices
Although parties can authenticate electronic business records by
traditional means for paper records, 8 1 a few district courts have
suggested "best practices" for authenticating recovered electronic
evidence. For instance, in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical
Industries, Ltd.,83 a Colorado district court concluded that the party
offering recovered computer evidence had a duty to use the forensic
technology that would "yield the most complete and accurate
results. ' 4 To reach this conclusion, the court considered competing
testimony from two computer forensics experts.85 The plaintiff's
expert used a program to retrieve "information... about files which
were once present on [defendant's] computer's hard drive, but were
deleted."86
The second expert testified that this method created a "file by
file" backup that lost or failed to capture important information on
the hard drive because it copied only existing, non-deleted 
files.8 7
Instead, the plaintiff's expert should have used an "image backup" of
the hard drive to collect every piece of available information.
88 The
second expert also noted that technology for such an image backup,
though rarely used, was available at the time of the first hard drive
exam. 8 9  Taking this into account, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had "failed to preserve evidence in the most appropriate
manner." 90  Because the plaintiff sought to use the electronic
information to its evidentiary advantage, the plaintiff-not the
defendant-had a duty to use the best technology available to
retrieve that information.
91
81. As described above, business records can be authenticated with the
testimony of a witness who is responsible for inputting or maintaining the
electronic information. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
82. This issue has yet to reach the appellate court level.
83. 167 F.R.D. 90 (D. Colo. 1996).
84. Id. at 112.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 113.
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Similarly, an Oregon district court noted that a forensic
examiner may be obligated to use a particular program to narrowly
tailor a computer search.92 Charged with unlawful possession of
child pornography, the defendant challenged the need for an offsite
search of his eight computers by a forensics expert. 93  The
investigating agent who seized the computers testified that, with a
certain program, "a computer could be scanned for the presence of
child pornography within just a few minutes." 94 However, the agent
did not bring this program with him when he searched the
defendant's house.
95
The district court did not find that the government had a duty to
use this program because the investigating agent had no way of
knowing, before entering the defendant's home, that he would find
eight computers instead of one. 96 Nevertheless, the court noted that
had there been evidence that a number of computers would be found,
the government (and its agents) might have had an obligation to use a
92. United States v. Greathouse, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Or. 2003).
93. Id. at 1275.
94. Id. at 1269. The investigating agent "explained that there is a computer
preview program known as ENCASE that has been available for many years
that makes it possible to quickly scan computers for certain information." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1275. Moreover, case law supports "the wholesale seizure of
computers and computer disks and records for later review for particular
evidence as the only reasonable means of conducting a search." Id.; see, e.z,
United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
warrant was sufficiently specific to search computer equipment, computer
generated printouts, data storage devices, and documentation of computer
hardware because evidence of child exploitation was explicitly described in the
supporting affidavit); United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 837-38 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that a search warrant including computer equipment was
sufficiently specific); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding
that because of the technical difficulties of conducting a computer search in a
suspect's home, the seizure of the computers was reasonable to allow police to
locate the offending files); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that search warrant including computer equipment was
sufficiently specific and did not need to include all possible locations on
computer where child pornography might be found). But see United States v.
Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that seizure of images of child
pornography from defendant's computer hard drive was not authorized by the
warrant because the images were in closed files and thus not in plain view).
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preview program for a quick, on-site scan of the computer's hard
drive.
97
In ruling on discovery motions, district courts recognize that
computer searches "are technical and complex and cannot be limited
to precise, specific steps or only one permissible method. 98  But,
when it comes to forensic recovery of files from computer hard
drives, these same courts often require a "mirror image" copy of the
data.99 For example, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 00 a
court in the Southern District of California ruled that the plaintiff
was entitled to discover deleted e-mails on the defendant's computer
hard drive.' 0 ' In so ruling, the court appointed a computer expert
(who specialized in the field of electronic discovery) to create a
"mirror image" of the defendant's hard drive. 1
02
In United States v. Alexander,10 3 the defendant sought access to
computer equipment seized from his home so that his expert witness
could examine it before trial. 0 4  The government resisted the
discovery motion, arguing that the computer, which allegedly
contained obscene images, should not leave government control; if
the defense expert wanted to examine the hard drive, he could do so
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") office.'0 5 The court,
however, granted the motion, requiring the FBI to furnish the
defendant's forensic examiner with a mirror image copy of the
computer's hard drive.'
06
97. Greathouse, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
98. United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 47 (D.
Conn. 2002); see also United States v. IBM, 76 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(ordering production of electronic data by defendant and appointment of a
court examiner "because of the complex and highly technical nature of the
information sought").
99. See Triumph Capital, 211 F.R.D. at 48 (describing a series of methods
used by a forensic expert to recover deleted data from a laptop computer and
describing the "mirror image" as an "exact duplicate of the entire hard drive,"
which "includes all the scattered clusters of the active and deleted files and the
slack and free space").
100. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
101. Id. at 1054-55.
102. Id. at 1055.
103. No. 04-20005-BC, 2004 WL 2095701 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 2004).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *5.
106. Id. at *10. Note that the court conditioned the transfer of the mirror
image copy on the expert's observance of a prescribed protocol. For instance,
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b. Authentication of recovered electronic data
Because of the relative complexity of computer based data
recovery, proponents often use-and courts often consider-a wide
variety of methods to authenticate electronic forensic evidence. For
example, courts will consider expert or non-expert witness
testimony 0 7 or other clues that point to the identity of the
evidence. 108  In some instances, courts will allow proponents to
authenticate recovered data using a combination of these methods.
i. Expert testimony not required
Like business records, computer forensic evidence can be
authenticated by the testimony of a witness with knowledge.
10 9
Because recovery techniques are technologically complex,
"knowledge" may mean that the witness must have a certain level of
skill or experience in the field of computer programming. However,
federal courts do not require the testimony of an expert trained in
forensic investigation. Rather, a witness must only demonstrate
personal knowledge of the data recovery process." 0 In the realm of
computer forensics, there is little case law on point. Nevertheless, as
the following cases illustrate, courts allow proponents to authenticate
electronic evidence with the testimony of someone who does not
have particular expertise in the field.
In United States v. Whitaker,"' the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to distribute marijuana. 12 To prove that he was involved
in a trafficking ring, the government offered computer records of the
drug transactions. 113 To authenticate the records, the government
the examiner was required to maintain a log of any copies of any images that
he made from the mirror image copy of the hard drive, and he was required to
return the mirror image copy to the FBI at the conclusion of the case. Id.
107. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(1).
108. Id. 901 (b)(4). Such clues or traces of identity may also be referred to as
"circumstantial evidence" in the traditional sense.
109. Id. 901(b)(1).
110. As discussed below, under Rule 702, an "expert" may be someone
with technical or other specialized knowledge. Therefore, someone with skill
or experience in computer programming or forensics-but who lacks
formal training--could qualify as an expert. See infra notes 140-149 and
accompanying text.
111. 127 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 1997).
112. Id.
113. Id. at598.
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relied on the testimony of a special agent who was present when the
recovery program was installed on the conspirator's computer and
the records were retrieved."14  The defendant argued that the
government failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 901(a)
because the agent did not have personal knowledge of the computer
system's operation. 1 5 The Seventh Circuit ruled, however, that the
agent's testimony was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the
computer records of the drug business because the agent testified
about his personal participation in obtaining the printouts." 
6
A Michigan district court echoed the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Scott-Emuakpor.117  There, the court ruled that the
testimony of a witness did not depend on his expertise or ability to
develop a sophisticated software program."18 The defendant moved
to suppress computer evidence obtained from "zip disks" and hard
drives seized by federal agents during a search of his home. 19 In so
moving, he argued that the testimony of two Secret Service agents
who examined the computer equipment and files was insufficient to
authenticate because neither of the agents was an expert in the area
of computer science. 120 The court denied the defendant's motion,
reasoning that, under Rule 901(a), expert testimony is not required
for authentication.' 2' The court noted that the question was not
whether the witnesses had the expertise to develop the sophisticated
software programs, but only whether the agents had the skill to find
out what was on the hard drive or zip disk.122 Because the court
found "no reason why either witness [could] not testify about what
114. Id. at601.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. No. 1:99-CR-138, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 25,
2000). Citing United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 1997),
the court indicated that "the Government may meet the authentication
requirement through the testimony of a witness who was present and observed
the procedure by which the documents were obtained from Defendant's
computers." Scott-Emuakpor, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at *38-*39.
118. Scott-Emuakpor, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at *38-*39.
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id. at *32-*33, *37-*39.
121. Id. at *37-*38. Rather, "a proponent need only offer some proof
showing that a piece of evidence is what the proponent claims it is." Id.
(emphasis added); see FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
122. Scott-Emuakpor, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at *33.
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they did in examining the computer and the results of their
examinations," the testimony was admissible for the purposes of
authentication. 
23
ii. When experts testify
Although an authenticating witness does not need to be an
expert in computer forensics, a proponent may still rely on an expert
to translate forensic evidence into a form that can be easily
understood by both the court and the jury. Furthermore, because
manipulation of electronic data may affect the reliability of the
evidence,124 computer experts may be called on to explain the impact
of the retrieval process.1 5 Like that of other experts, the testimony
of computer forensic examiners must meet standards of reliability
and relevancy. 126 Although only a handful of federal cases involve
electronic forensics and expert testimony, 27 it is important for
litigants to predict whether and how they might offer such testimony
to support or challenge the admissibility of electronic evidence.' 
28
123. Id. ("By analogy, a person need not be an expert on English literature in
order to know how to read.").
124. See, e.g., United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Any question as
to the accuracy of the printouts ... would have affected only the weight of the
printouts, not their admissibility.")
125. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1464-65 (9th Cir.
1994) (using an expert to explain how the suspect's height was calculated from
video surveillance).
126. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
127. See, e.g., Scott-Emuakpor, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at *37; United
States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 1997); Quinn, 18 F.3d at 1464-
65.
128. The key to understanding these issues is the federal courts' role as
"gatekeeper" of expert testimony. The need for a "gatekeeper" was first
articulated in 1923 in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In
its decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia presciently
noted that "[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define." Id. at
1014. Nevertheless, the Court attempted to define that line. For an excellent
overview of the evolution of the federal courts' "gatekeeper" function since
Frye, see Leslie Morsek, Comment, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life!
The Ups, the Downs, the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the
"Gatekeeper" Function to Scientific and Non-scientific Expert Evidence:
Kumho's Expansion ofDaubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689 (2001).
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Before 1975, federal courts applied the "general acceptance" test
articulated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Frye v. United States.129 According to this test, district courts could
admit expert testimony only after the proponent "sufficiently
established" that the method or principle on which the testimony was
based had "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belong[ed].,' 130 The applicability of Frye's "general acceptance"
test was called into doubt when Congress enacted the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 13' The Rules expanded the subjects proper for expert
testimony and the formats in which experts could testify. 132  In
addition, the Rules did not incorporate the "general acceptance"
test. 133 Nevertheless, many federal courts continued to follow the
Frye standard, including the Ninth Circuit. 1
34
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 135 the United
States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the Rules by overruling a
Ninth Circuit decision which applied the "general acceptance"
test. 136  The Court held that "general acceptance" was not a
"precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the
Rules of Evidence."' 137 Instead, the Court interpreted Rule 702 and
held that the trial judge must "ensur[e] that an expert's testimony
both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
129. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
130. Id. at 1014. This test of "general acceptance" served as the "first
procedural barrier to the admission of scientific evidence and expert
testimony" in the federal courts. See Morsek, supra note 128, at 698.
131. See Morsek, supra note 128, at 700-03.
132. Id. at 700 n.48; see FED. R. EvID. 702-705.
133. Morsek, supra note 128, at 701-02.
134. Id. at 703; see, e.g., Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d
1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying both the Frye test and the Federal Rules
of Evidence); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990)
("Rule 702 and Frye both require the same general approach to the
admissibility of new scientific evidence."); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d
475, 480 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Evidence that does not qualify under Frye must be
excluded."); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Frye
is still the law in this Circuit."); United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522,
1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting the Frye test as the proper standard for
admissibility of evidence based on a novel scientific technique).
135. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
136. Id. at 584, 597.
137. Id. at 597.
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hand."' 3 8 Yet, before the trial judge engages in these "gatekeeper"
duties, two threshold questions must be answered: First, how can a
witness qualify as an "expert" under the Federal Rules? And second,
if the district courts' gatekeeping function applies to the admission of
scientific evidence, does it also apply to the admission of non-
scientific expert evidence?
139
(a) How can a witness qualify as an "expert"?
To answer the first question, litigants can look to Rule 702's
broadly phrased definition of "expert":
140
The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not
limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical" but extend
to all "specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is
viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by
"knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." Thus
within the scope of the rule are not only experts in the
strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, physicists, and
architects, but also the large groups sometimes called
"skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or landowners
testifying to land values. 141
With this Rule, Congress opened the door to testimony from a wide
range of witnesses with skill or experience in computer forensics.
For instance, although the court in United States v. Whitaker 142 did
not explicitly address the qualifications of the witness as an "expert,"
it noted that the government established a foundation for forensic
evidence when an FBI agent testified about his role in installing the
retrieval program and subsequently obtaining the data printouts. 43
In addition, at least one circuit court has recognized that expert
testimony in the field of electronic evidence does not demand the use
138. Id.
139. See Morsek, supra note 128, at 719.
140. FED. R. EVID. 702.
141. Id. 702 advisory committee's note.
142. 127 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 1997).
143. Id. at 601. And, as discussed earlier, the court in United States v. Scott-
Emuakpor, No. 1:99-CR-138, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at *33 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 25, 2000) held that "expertise" in computer forensics did not require
the witness to know how to develop a sophisticated software program. Rather,
the witness only had to have the skill to find out what was on a hard drive or
zip drive. Id.
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of "scientific" techniques. In United States v. Quinn,144 the lower
court admitted testimony of a photogrammetry expert, who
calculated the height of a bank robber using computer and video
surveillance.145  The Ninth Circuit held that the testimony was
properly admitted because the lower court, applying Rule 702 and
the Daubert standard, could conclude that the expert's testimony was
reliable, even though it was based on a "series of computer-assisted
calculation[s] that did not involve any novel or questionable
scientific technique."'
146
As these cases illustrate, proponents of forensic evidence are not
strictly limited by the credentials or techniques of their proposed
expert witnesses. This does not mean, however, that the trial court
will simply "tak[e] the expert's word for it."' 147 "If the witness is
relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must
explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why
that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that
experience is reliably applied to the facts."' 148 Nevertheless, the
breadth of expert qualification under Rule 702 is particularly
beneficial for proponents of forensic computer evidence because
experience may be the predominant (or the only) basis for reliable
testimony. 1
49
144. 18 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).
145. Id. at 1464.
146. Id. at 1465 (emphasis added).
147. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
148. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1399 (9th Cir.
1995), vacated by 509 U.S. 579 (1993); FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory
committee's note.
149. See FED. R. EvlD. 702 advisory committee's note; see also United
States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1161 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding no abuse of
discretion in admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner with years of
practical experience and extensive training); Tassin v. Sears Roebuck, 946
F.Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996) (holding that a design engineer's
testimony was admissible when opinions were based in part on technical and
mechanical expertise). In addition, qualification of a witness as an "expert"
will raise strategic considerations, such as the cost of the witness and the jury's
perception of an "expert" as perhaps more credible than other witnesses.
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(b) Are district courts "gatekeepers "for
non-scientific expert evidence?
Congress and the Supreme Court only recently answered the
second question. While Daubert provided some guidance for federal
judges in their "gatekeeper role," it did little or nothing to define the
scope of an expert's testimony. In a footnote of the opinion, the
Court recognized that Rule 702 also applies to "technical, or other
specialized knowledge," but it limited its discussion to the scientific
context, based on the nature of the testimony offered in that case.
150
Although no cases involving electronic evidence raised the issue of
Daubert's applicability to non-scientific testimony,' 51  courts
struggled with this distinction in other areas of expert testimony. 152
Some courts restricted Daubert to scientific evidence, 153 while others
reasoned that Daubert was equally applicable to non-scientific
evidence.
154
Six years after Daubert, the Supreme Court weighed in on the
conflict. In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael,' the Court held
that although Daubert is not a "definitive checklist or test," the
gatekeeping function of district courts applies to both "scientific"
and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge. 156  To further
150. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
151. Although the court in Scott-Emuakpor does not expressly state so, it
suggests that a witness without scientific expertise may nevertheless qualify as
an "expert" and hence the "non-scientific" testimony of this expert may be
weighed under a Daubert analysis: "The fact that Agent Christy admitted that
he is not an expert in the area of computer science is not binding on the Court
in performing its Daubert gatekeeping function as recently extended by the
Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael." 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3118, at *33 (citations omitted).
152. Morsek, supra note 128, at 720.
153. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (1 1th
Cir. 1997); McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806-08 (9th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir. 1997);
Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996);
Iacobelli Const., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994).
154. See, e.g., Wakins v. Telsmith, 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997);
Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368 (7th Cir. 1996).
155. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
156. Id. at 138. The Court explained that Rule 702 "grant[s] all expert
witnesses, not just 'scientific' ones, testimonial latitude unavailable to other
witnesses." Id. Thus, courts do not have to administer evidentiary rules based
on the kind of expert testimony or knowledge presented, because there is often
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elucidate the courts' gatekeeping role, and in response to Daubert
and Kumho Tire, Congress amended Rule 702 in 2000.157 The Rule
is now consistent with Kumho, providing that "all types of expert
testimony present questions of admissibility for the trial court in
deciding whether the evidence is reliable and helpful."' 5 8 Further, it
is intended to encompass and supersede a Daubert analysis: "The
standards set forth in the amendment are broad enough to require
consideration of any or all of the specific Daubert factors where
appropriate."' 
59
At least in theory, Rule 702 is important to the use of electronic
evidence because experts often testify about non-scientific issues,
such as the interpretation of computer records of a suspected drug
trafficking business. 160 To date, no federal court presented with
electronic evidence has drawn a distinction between expert testimony
involving scientific knowledge and expert testimony involving non-
scientific knowledge. Given Rule 702's flexibility and broad
applicability to other types of evidence, 161 it is unlikely that courts
will make such a distinction. Nevertheless, proponents must still be
cognizant of the requirements of Rule 702.162
no clear line between what is "scientific" and what is merely "technical" or
"other specialized" knowledge. Id.
157. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
158. Id.
159. Id. Rule 702 now provides that an expert may testify if three
requirements are met: "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case." FED. R. EvID. 702.
160. See United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating that a federal agent testified as an expert to interpret computer
generated drug records).
161. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note. Moreover, non-Daubert
factors might also be relevant to determining whether expert testimony is
sufficiently reliable. Id.; see, e.g., Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104
F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the expert was not as careful as he
would be in regular paid professional work); Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29
F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) (excluding testimony where the expert failed to
consider other obvious causes of the plaintiff's condition).
162. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
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iii. Authentication by other methods
Because the authentication methods mentioned in Rule 901(b)
are not exclusive, proponents of electronic evidence do not have to
prove authentication by any particular method. 163 They are free to
use any method or combination of methods that will provide
evidence sufficient to support a finding of authenticity. In addition, a
proponent may authenticate evidence by its "[a]ppearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken
in conjunction with circumstances."' 164 In other words, proponents
can rely on circumstantial evidence of authenticity. Given the low
burden of proof for authentication and courts' general acceptance of
electronic evidence, it is not surprising that courts have adopted a
flexible approach.
In United States v. Simpson,165 the defendant argued that a
computer printout of an alleged chat room discussion between an
FBI agent and himself was not authenticated because the government
could not identify the statements attributed to the defendant by his
handwriting, writing style, or voice. 166 The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, concluding instead that these specific examples of
authentication were "merely illustrative. .. and [were] not intended
as an exclusive enumeration of allowable methods of
authentication."' 167  The court held that the government properly
authenticated the chat room printout, using a variety of facts: the
printout of the chat room discussion revealed the screen name the
defendant gave to the agent as well as the defendant's street address;
the discussion included an e-mail address belonging to the defendant;
and pages found near the computer in the defendant's home
contained a notation of the name, street address, e-mail address, and
telephone number the agent gave to the individual in the chat
room. 1
68
163. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
164. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(4).
165. 152 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998).
166. Id. at 1249. The defendant referred to Rule 901(b)(2) through (5). Id.
Subsection 2 provides for a nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of
handwriting; subsection 3 provides for comparison of specimens by the trier of
fact or expert witness; subsection 4 provides for circumstantial evidence; and
subsection 5 provides for voice identification. FED. R. EvID. 901 (b)(2)-(5).
167. Simpson, 152 F.3d at 1249-50.
168. Id. at 1250.
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Likewise, in United States v. Tank,169 the Ninth Circuit held that
the government adequately established a connection between the
defendant and chat room log printouts.170 Without citing a particular
subsection of Rule 901, the court concluded that the logs were
authenticated, based on testimony of a co-conspirator who described
how the logs were created and who identified them as accurate
representations of the chat room discussions. 17 1 In addition, the court
pointed to evidence that defendant participated in these
conversations: his screen name, "Cessna," appeared on the chat
room printouts, and when participants arranged a meeting with the
person who used the screen name "Cessna," the defendant showed
UP.172
The Eleventh Circuit has also adopted a flexible approach for
authentication of electronic evidence. In United States v. Siddiqui,1
73
the court determined that the government properly authenticated an
e-mail message, using circumstantial evidence. 74 For instance, the
message bore the defendant's e-mail address at the University of
South Alabama, and when the recipient replied, the reply function in
his e-mail system automatically sent a message to the defendant's
address as the sender. 175 In addition, the message referred to the
author as "Mo," the defendant's nickname, and when the recipient
finally spoke to the defendant on the phone, he made the same
requests made in the e-mail message.176
169. 200 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000).
170. Id. at 630.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 630-31.
173. 235 F.3d 1318 (llth Cir. 2000).
174. Id. at 1322 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 901(b)(4)); see also United States v.
Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1403-09 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a series of radio-
telegrams were properly authenticated based on a combination of testimony
and other circumstantial features); Mark D. Robins, Evidence at the Electronic
Frontier: Introducing E-Mail at Trial in Commercial Litigation, 29 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219, 229-30 (2003) (describing Reilly as an example
of authenticating a chain of communications using Rule 901 (b)(4)).
175. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1322.
176. Id. at 1323.
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C. Foundations for Electronic Evidence: Private Business
Records & the Hearsay Exception
After crossing the first admissibility hurdle, a proponent may
next face a hearsay objection. Since electronic business records are
written assertions or communications made outside of court, they
constitute hearsay when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. 177  However, Federal Rule 803(6) includes an
exception for business records, 178 based on reliability and the need
for a cumulative source of information.' 
79
If electronic records are "unreliable," then they are probably
inadmissible on both authenticity and hearsay grounds. This is so
because the business records exception to the hearsay rule effectively
incorporates an authentication requirement. 180 In particular, if all
other requirements for the exception are met, 18 business records are
admissible, "unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."'
182
This criterion is analogous to the Rule 901(a) requirement that there
must be "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims."'183 Thus, evidence that is
excluded on authenticity grounds should also be excluded as
hearsay. 1
84
With this in mind, some courts bypass an explicit authenticity
analysis and instead look to the requirements of the hearsay
exception to determine whether the proponent has established a
proper foundation.185 Courts do so not because of the more stringent
requirements of the exception, but rather because they recognize
computers as inherently reliable. 186 In fact, at least one court has
stated that electronic evidence has "a prima facie aura of
177. See FED. R. EviD. 801.
178. Id. 803(6).
179. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED
APPROACH 223 (2004).
180. See Joseph, supra note 39, at B10.
181. See infra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
182. FED. R. EvID. 803(6); see id. 803(8).
183. Id. 901(a).
184. See Joseph, supra note 39, at B10.
185. For this and further criticism of the approach, see Givens, supra note 9,
at 106-08.
186. See id. at 106.
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reliability." 187  Thus, courts primarily concern themselves with
whether electronic records meet other requirements of the hearsay
exception, e.g., whether the records are kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity.
Because requirements for the hearsay exception may be
duplicative of those for authentication, it may be more efficient for
litigants and courts to consider only the business records
exception. 188  Specifically, the authenticity and hearsay exception
analyses dovetail when a person with knowledge of the records
testifies. 189 Although the Rules do not require it, a proponent may
choose to authenticate electronic records with the testimony of a
witness with knowledge. 190 However, as discussed below, the
proponent must lay the foundation for the hearsay exception with a
"person with knowledge."' 91  Hence, a proponent could
simultaneously satisfy the requirement of authentication and at least
one of the requirements of the hearsay exception with witness
testimony. 
92
1. Rule 803(6): Electronic or Paper?
When a proponent offers business records into evidence under
the hearsay exception, a court will generally accept the records in
electronic format. 193 Thus, whether a business record is maintained
in a company computer or among the company's printed records is
often immaterial to the court's analysis. 194 This is consistent with
187. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1337,
1343 (M.D. Ga. 2001) (citing Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418
F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir. 1969)).
188. See id.; United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 1997). There
is a parallel trend in state courts. See, e.g., People v. Lugashi, 205 Cal. App.
3d 632 (1988); People v. Huehn, 53 P.3d 733 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); see also
Givens, supra note 9, at 106 (suggesting that proponents of electronic evidence
need not prove both foundational elements).
189. See infra Part VI.C.2.a.
190. See supra notes 20-21 and Part VI.B. l.a.
191. See infra Part VI.C.2.a.
192. As discussed below, there are other requirements that must be met
before a court will admit a business record under the hearsay exception in
803(6). See infra Parts VI.C.2.b-c.
193. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
194. Over thirty years ago, the Ninth Circuit noted that "it is immaterial that
the business record is maintained in a computer rather than in company
books," assuming that a proper foundation is laid. United States v. De
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Rule 803(6), which provides that a business record may be "[a]
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form."'
195
Accordingly, courts have found that a variety of computer generated
records or forms fall within the exception. For instance, federal
courts have admitted bills of lading, 196 Federal Express delivery
records,197  Medicaid claim forms, 198  insurance cancellation
notices, 199 and memos of telephone conversations under Rule
803(6).200
2. Laying the Foundation
Like all types of evidence, computerized records are admissible
only after the proponent establishes a sufficient foundation for their
introduction. Rule 803(6) sets out several foundational elements for
business records. 20 1  Although courts interpret these elements in
various ways, they generally agree on three requirements. 20 2 First, a
Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 893 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1969). More recently, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the use of a computer ledger does not change the result when
the ledger is offered as evidence of the company's inventory and payroll.
United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Sea-
Land Serv., Inc., v. Lozen Int'l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that electronic bills of lading are business records under the
hearsay exception); United States v. Layne, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9375, *17
(6th Cir. Apr. 19, 1994) (stating that computers do not need to be "tested for
programming errors before computer records are admitted" (quoting United
States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 915 (1st Cir. 1991)).
195. FED. R. EviD. 803(6) (emphasis added). According to the Advisory
Committee, "data compilation" is "broadly descriptive of any means of storing
information other than the conventional words and figures in written or
documentary form." The Committee also states that this is "by no means
limited to... electronic computer storage." Id. advisory committee's note. As
described above, this may open the door to new types of electronic evidence,
like cellular tower and electronic toll booth records. See also supra note 5 and
accompanying text (discussing potential application of the Federal Rules to
new digital and electronic technologies).
196. Sea-Land Serv. Inc., 285 F.3d at 819-20.
197. Dino Constr. Co. v. McWane, Inc., 198 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir.
1999).
198. United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1984).
199. Hardison v. Balboa Ins. Co., 4 Fed. Appx. 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.
2001).
200. United States v. Goodchild, 25 F.3d 55, 61-62 (lst Cir. 1994).
201. FED. R. EvIm. 803(6).
202. According to United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir.
1988),
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foundation for the hearsay exception must be established by someone
who demonstrates sufficient knowledge of the record-keeping
system. 3 Second, the records must be "kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity." 204 Third, the source of
information and the method of preparation must be trustworthy.
20 5
a. A person with sufficient knowledge
Before a court will admit electronic business records as
evidence, a witness must describe how the records were created and
maintained.20 6 As early as 1980, the Fifth Circuit recognized that a
foundational witness need only be in a position to attest to the
authenticity of the electronic records.207 In addition, the witness does
[t]he proponent of the business records must satisfy the foundational
requirements of the business records exception. [Rule] 803(6) allows
for the admission of business records when they are: (1) made or
based on information transmitted by a person with knowledge at or
near the time of the transaction; (2) made in the ordinary course of
business; and (3) trustworthy, with neither the source of information
nor method or circumstances of preparation indicating a lack of
trustworthiness.
Other courts have adopted a slightly different approach to the exception. For
instance, the Tenth Circuit considers computer business records admissible if:
"(1) they are kept pursuant to a routine procedure designed to assure their
accuracy, (2) they are created for motives that tend to assure accuracy (e.g., not
including those prepared for litigation), and (3) they are not themselves mere
accumulations of hearsay." United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10
(10th Cir. 1994), see United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1512 (10th
Cir. 1990). The Tenth Circuit follows the approach taken by the Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits. E.., United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (1 lth Cir.
1985); Capital Marine Supply, Inc. v. M/V Roland Thomas, II, 719 F.2d 104,
106 (5th Cir. 1983); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
203. Catabran, 836 F.2d at 457; FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
204. FED. R. EvID. 803(6); see also Catabran, 836 F.2d at 457 (explaining
foundational requirements for the business records exception).
205. Catabran, 836 F.2d at 457; see FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
206. See United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985);
Casamassima & Caplicki, supra note 6, at 14. In some cases, a business record
may be self-authenticating. Instead of presenting a qualified witness, the
proponent may present certification of regularly conducted activity that
complies with Rule 902(11) (domestic records), Rule 902(12) (foreign
records), or with a statute that permits such certification. FED. R. EVID. 902.
207. Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that
testimony of the company's comptroller was "sufficient to lay the proper
predicate for the admission of the records"). This too illustrates overlap
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not need to know how the computer program works, nor must the
witness be the one who personally prepared the records. 20 8 For
instance, in United States v. Catabran,709 the Ninth Circuit ruled that
a printout of a company's ledger was admissible where the
bookkeeper testified that she "put into the computer sales, inventory,
payroll, and tax information on a current basis."
210
Proponents of electronic business records can rely on a variety
of witnesses, from any level of an organization's hierarchy. For
example, courts in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have accepted
testimony of upper management that the records were part of the
company's business activities. In Hardison v. Balboa Insurance
Co.,211 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the vice-president of
tracking operations satisfied this foundational requirement when, in
her affidavit, she stated that she was "competent to testify about the
computer system that created the documents and she explained how
data was entered and retrieved from the system."2 12 Similarly, in
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Lozen International,2 13 the Ninth Circuit
held that a shipping company's manager of documentation was a
qualified witness under 803(6) because she had sufficient knowledge
to testify that computer records "did in fact contain the true and
correct terms and conditions of [the company's] bills of lading."
214
b. Kept in the course of business
A witness with knowledge may also help satisfy the second
requirement for the hearsay exception. That is, the witness may
testify that the records were "kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity," 215 and that "it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the.., record, or data
between authentication and the hearsay exception. If a witness with
knowledge can testify as to the authenticity of the record, then he has also
properly authenticated it under FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(1), meaning that the
witness has shown the matter to be what it is claimed to be.
208. Rosenberg, 624 F.2d at 665.
209. 836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1988).
210. Id. at 457.
211. 4 Fed. Appx. 663 (10th Cir. 2001).
212. Id. at 670.
213. 285 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2002).
214. Id. at 820.
215. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
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compilation." 2 16 The purpose of this requirement is to ensure the
reliability of the evidence, via a duty to make and regularly maintain
such records. 217  Proponents satisfy this requirement with little
difficulty because they need not use these records in any particular
way or for any particular purpose. For instance, in Catabran, the
defendant argued that computer printouts were not made in the
ordinary course of business because he did not rely on them for
inventory purposes; rather, they were used for financial reporting and
to secure loans.2 1 8 However, the court rejected this argument, stating
that Rule 803(6) does not require that a business use the document in
such a specific way.219
In addition, electronic business records do not have to be the
result of an automated process or regular data entry. For instance, in
United States v. Goodchild,22 ° the First Circuit held that computer
printouts of memos made by a credit card company's collection
personnel during telephone calls to cardholders were properly
admitted under 803(6). 221 The court concluded that the records met
"the strictures of the rule" since they were made either during the
telephone calls or immediately thereafter.222 Moreover, the memos
were made during the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, i.e., investigations of delinquent credit card accounts, and it
was the regular practice of the collections personnel to make a record
of these calls.
2 23
Although a business does not have to rely on electronic
documents or records for any particular purpose, records may be
inadmissible if they are made or printed solely for the purposes of
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 945 (1st Cir. 1989);
Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 628 (1st Cir.
1988); United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98 (D. Mass. 1997).
218. United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1988).
219. Id.
220. 25 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 1994).
221. Id. at62.
222. Id.
223. Id. The court also noted that the manager of the fraud department was a
witness qualified to explain the memos. Id. Even though he did not record the
memos himself, he "understood both the procedure followed by collections in
investigating delinquent accounts and the records required to be kept of such
investigations." Id.
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224litigation. For instance, in Potamkin Cadillac v. B.R.I. Coverage
Corp.,225 the Second Circuit found inadmissible a computer
generated history of insurance premiums that had been prepared at
226the request of counsel. 2 6 The Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Blackburn22 7 also refused to find that reports specifically prepared
for the FBI were admissible under the hearsay exception. 228 In that
case, a robbery suspect left a pair of eyeglasses on the front seat of a
stolen automobile used to escape from the crime scene.229 At the
request of the FBI, a company that manufactured custom eyeglasses
prepared an analysis of the prescription for the lenses, and the district
court admitted the computer printouts of the lensometer readings as a
record of regularly conducted activity. 23  However, the court of
appeals held that the record was inadmissible because it was
"specially prepared at the behest of the FBI and with the knowledge
that any information it supplied would be used in an ongoing
criminal investigation."
231
In contrast, courts will admit business records that have been
extracted from electronic files and printed for litigation purposes, as
long as the original data compilation was prepared according to a
business practice.232 The Sixth Circuit held in United States v.
Russo233 that the computer printout of an insurance claim was
admissible, even though it was made months after the claim was
filed: "Since the computer printout is just a presentation in
structured and comprehensible form of a mass of individual items, it
is immaterial that the printout itself was not prepared until 11 months
224. This problem arises because Rule 803(6) states that, to be admissible, a
business record of "acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses" must be
"made at or near the time" of that event or condition. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
225. 38 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 1994).
226. Id. at 632-33. The court also held that the record was inadmissible as a
business record because it constituted attorney work product. Id.
227. 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993).
228. Id. at 670.
229. Id. at 669-70.
230. Id. at 670.
231. Id.
232. See Casamassima & Caplicki, supra note 6, at 15 ("Because the
computer records offered at trial are often printed out solely for the trial, a
party may object to the introduction of the printouts, based on the fact that the
printouts were not contemporaneous with the events recorded on the
computer .... ).
233. 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973).
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after the close of the year[]." 234 The court also noted that it would
too severely restrict the admissibility of computerized records if the
computer printout-as well as the input on which it was based-had
to be produced at or within a reasonable time after the related
transaction.
235
The Seventh Circuit echoed this conclusion almost twenty years
later in United States v. Briscoe.236 There, the court noted in dicta
that although the computer printouts of telephone call data were
prepared specifically for that case, it was "sufficient that the data
compiled in the printouts was entered into the computer
contemporaneous with the placing of each telephone call. 237 Citing
Briscoe, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Fujii8 held that an
airline's reservation and check-in records were also admissible under
the hearsay exception.239 Even though the printouts of the records
were made specifically for trial, it was the regular business practice
of the airline to make the entries into the computer system, and the
records were kept as part of the airline's regular business activity.
240
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hernandez24' held
that immigration service printouts reflecting the defendant's amnesty
status were admissible because the original computer data
compilation was made "pursuant to a business duty in accordance
with regular business practice." 242 That the printout was made for
the purposes of litigation did not affect the records' admissibility.
243
c. Trustworthiness
Before a court will admit a business record under the hearsay
exception, the proponent must demonstrate that the underlying
source of information and the method or circumstances of
234. Id. at 1240.
235. Id.
236. 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990).
237. Id. at 1494 n.13.
238. 301 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002).
239. Id. at 539.
240. Id.
241. 913 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1990).
242. Id. at 1512.
243. Id.
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preparation are trustworthy. 244  Federal courts have rejected the
argument that computer based records are inherently less trustworthy
than paper records and thus in need of a more solid foundation.
245
For instance, in United States v. Catabran, the defendant argued that
the lower "court erred in admitting [computer inventory] printouts
because they were inaccurate and therefore untrustworthy.'" 246 He
argued that the inaccuracy could have resulted from an error in data
entry or from the computer program itself, which applied an
automatic markup to the inventory figures.247 The Ninth Circuit,
however, concluded that the records were appropriately admitted
because the witness who input the data testified that she double-
checked her figures, and she could (and did) override the automatic
markup function of the computer program.
248
Importantly, the security of computer systems and their
vulnerability to manipulation has not posed a significant problem for
the admission of computer based records. For instance, in United
States v. Glasser,24 9 the defendant challenged the security of the
computer system, but the court held that "[t]he existence of an air-
tight security system is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of
244. FED. R. EvID. 803(6). Soon after the Federal Rules were enacted in
1975, "federal judges substantially agree[d] that computer output should be
qualified like any other business record." Peritz, supra note 6, at 958. Peritz
also notes that judicial consensus evolved "despite the fact that computer
systems store, retrieve, and manipulate information in ways significantly
different from earlier manual or mechanical systems." Id. at 958.
245. See United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 915 (lst Cir. 1991) (stating
that "ordinary business circumstances... suggest trustworthiness"); United
States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494-95 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that a
proponent of computer generated records need only "provide[] sufficient facts
to warrant a finding that the records are trustworthy"); United States v. Young
Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument that
computer generated records are less reliable than paper records and hence, in
need of greater foundation); see also Kurzban, supra note 37, at 444-45
(describing this as the current federal standard).
246. 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988).
247. Id.
248. Id. The court went on to state that "[a]ny question as to the accuracy of
the printouts.., as with inaccuracies in any other type of business records,
would have affected only the weight of the printouts, not their admissibility."
Id. As this case illustrates, the testimony of one qualified witness can satisfy
all the requirements of the business records exception.
249. 773 F.2d 1553 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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computer printouts., 250 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Hutson251 ruled that computer printouts were trustworthy enough
to be admitted in an embezzlement prosecution because access to the
system was limited by the use of a special code.
252
However, in recent cases involving the Internet, courts have
been more skeptical of the source or method of preparation of
evidence. 253 In United States v. Jackson, for example, the defendant
tried to admit Web postings of alleged white supremacist groups,
arguing that they were "business" records of the groups' Internet
Service Providers.254  The Seventh Circuit flatly rejected her
argument, stating that Internet Service Providers are "merely
conduits" which do not monitor the contents of Web sites.255
Moreover, the court noted that "[t]he fact that the Internet Service
Providers may be able to retrieve information that [their] customers
posted or email that [their] customers sent does not turn that material
into a business record . ,,256
Thus, for regular, non-Internet based electronic records,
fulfilling the normal foundational requirements, e.g., providing the
testimony of a witness with knowledge and demonstrating the
accuracy of the records, may expose any underlying manipulation or
falsification. Yet where Internet or Web postings are offered as
business records, courts may need to take a closer look at their
trustworthiness. To date, no federal court has held that Web pages or
Internet postings are "business records" according to the Rule 803(6)
hearsay exception.
257
250. Id. at 1559. The court also concluded that if such a system of security
was a prerequisite to admissibility, "it would become virtually impossible to
admit computer generated records; the party opposing admission would have
to show only that a better security system was feasible." Id.
251. 821 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1987).
252. Id. at 1020; cf United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1528-29 (5th
Cir. 1985) (holding billing memoranda were still admissible, even though they
were sometimes falsified).
253. United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000); St. Clair v.
Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
254. Jackson, 208 F.3d at 637.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. However, data-driven functions on Web sites, e.g., online sales
transactions, might meet the requirements of the hearsay exception, whereas
"static" data, such as .html postings, might not.
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D. Public Records
The records of public agencies or offices must also be supported
by a proper evidentiary foundation. As with private business
records, courts apply more than one standard for determining
whether the proponent has satisfied this requirement. As discussed
above, public records may be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(7), or
they may be self-authenticating under Rule 902.258  Once
authenticated, these records are subject to a hearsay objection and a
hearsay exception: computer records of a public office or agency
may be admitted under the hearsay exception of Rule 803(8).259
Unlike private business records, public records may be admitted
without the testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness.
260
Underlying this rule is the assumption that public officials will
perform their duties properly, but will not remember the details of
countless, unspecified records.
261
Not surprisingly, the federal government often seeks to
introduce computer printouts of tax records to support allegations of
tax evasion. Courts generally admit tax records under part of the
public records hearsay exception that covers "matters observed
pursuant to [a] duty imposed by law .. ,262 For example, in
258. See supra Part VI.B.I.b.
259. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
260. Compare id. 803(6) (requiring "the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness.. .") with id. 803(8) (no such requirement).
261. Id. 803(8) advisory committee's note. Although the exception under
Rule 803(8) does not require a foundational witness, other factors weigh in
admissibility. Id. In particular, admissibility of the public record hinges on the
content of the record, e.g., whether it contains "matters observed" or evaluative
reports, and whether it is used in a civil case or by or against the government in
criminal cases. Id.
262. Id. 803(8); e.g., Malkin v. United States, 243 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that information in IRS database was sufficiently reliable to
constitute a public record and hence, was admissible to prove that taxpayer had
executed consent to extension of limitations period); E.W. Scripps Co. v.
United States, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1025 n.7 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that
IRS document locator code was admissible under a hearsay exception, despite
the government's urging to disregard the code); United States v. Boyce, 148 F.
Supp. 2d 1069, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that IRS Forms 4340 were
admissible under the public records exception); United States v. Estabrook, 78
F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that IRS transcript was within
official records exception to hearsay rule); Rossi v. United States, 755 F. Supp.
314, 317 (D. Or. 1990) (holding that IRS Forms 4340 were admissible under
the public records exception).
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Hughes v. United States,263 the Ninth Circuit held that IRS forms
offered by the government to show the defendants' tax assessment
were admissible under the hearsay exception. 264  Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Childress265 ruled that the
defendant's tax records, as certified by the IRS, were admissible as
public records under Rule 803(8).266
Because a tax evasion claim rests on an alleged failure to pay
taxes, the government must often prove the absence of payment. In
this situation, the pertinent exemption to the hearsay rule is Rule
803(10), which provides for the admission of evidence of the
absence of a public record or entry.267 To prove the "nonoccurrence
or nonexistence of a matter," the proponent must offer "evidence of a
certification in accordance with [R]ule 902, or testimony, that a
diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data
compilation... ,,268 For instance, in United States v. Bowers,269 the
court admitted the government's compilation of assessments and
payments, showing no electronic record of returns filed by the
defendants. 270  The district court admitted the records under Rule
803(10), but the defendants challenged their admission, arguing that
IRS employees in Philadelphia who prepared the compilations were
not the "custodians" of the data stored in the IRS mainframe
computer in Virginia. 271 The Fourth Circuit upheld the admission,
concluding that the rule only required a "diligent search," and
because the employees had remote access to the mainframe
computer, the agency did not have to send a witness from the
263. 953 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1992).
264. Id. at 539-40.
265. 24 Fed. Appx. 139 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished decision).
266. Id. at 142. The court did not specify which part of the rule applied to
the tax records. Id. Because this was a criminal case, and the records were
admitted against the defendant, they were likely admitted by the court under
part (A) of Rule 803(8), as records of "the activities of the office or
agency ..... " See FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(A).
267. FED. R. EvID. 803(10).
268. Id.
269. 920 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1990).
270. Id. at 223-24; see also United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1241-42
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that IRS Certificate of Assessments and Payments
were admissible under the Rule 803(10) absence of public record exception to
prove defendants had not filed tax returns).
271. Bowers, 920 F.2d at 223.
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physical location of the mainframe just to present the data in court.2 7 2
Moreover, as long as the witness had full access to search the
agency's computer, conducted the search diligently, and was
available for cross-examination, "the concern for trustworthiness
embedded in the rules of evidence [was] satisfied.
273
E. Foundations for E-Mail and Internet Evidence
Although courts recognize the admissibility of electronic
business records under the hearsay exception, they are less willing to
admit e-mail and Internet evidence. Because e-mail can be created
spontaneously and in response to individual events or conversations,
courts often conclude that e-mail messages are not kept in the course
of regularly conducted business activities. 274 In addition, courts
struggle with the vulnerability and manipulability of Internet and e-
mail evidence.
275
1. E-mail Evidence
Compared with other forms of electronic evidence, e-mail
evidence has received relatively little attention in the federal courts.
A proponent could offer e-mail created in the business context as a
"business record" and thus could try to satisfy the requirements of
the hearsay exception. As discussed above, however, the business
records exception to the hearsay rule has a number of conditions that
must be satisfied. 27 6 Under the Federal Rules, the benefits of e-mail
communication in today's business environment-notably, its
spontaneity and rapid dissemination-are also roadblocks to its
admission. Because e-mail can be created on the spur of the moment
and in response to countless situations, it is difficult if not impossible
for a proponent to establish that the message was created in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity. Yet, despite this
272. Id. at 223-24.
273. Id. at 223.
274. See United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98-99 (D. Mass. 1997)
("Were it otherwise, virtually any document found in the files of a business
which pertained in any way to the functioning of that business would be
admitted willy-nilly as a business record. This is not the law.").
275. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting web postings); St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (rejecting same).
276. See supra Part VI.C.2.
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difficulty, courts have considered the admissibility of e-mail in a few
notable cases.
a. Authentication
As with other electronically stored information, authentication
and the hearsay rule present primary hurdles to the admission of e-
mail evidence. In United States v. Siddiqui,277 the defendant attacked
the government's use of e-mail evidence on both grounds, arguing
that it was offered without proper authentication and that it
constituted inadmissible hearsay. 278 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the
district court's holding that the e-mail evidence was admissible
because it was properly authenticated under Rule 901(b)(4) based on
circumstantial evidence.2 79 The court of appeals also held that the
defendant's hearsay objections were based on authenticity issues,
and thus were not proper objections.
28 0
Courts might also consider whether e-mail is self-authenticating.
Under Rule 902, one category of self-authenticating documents
includes "[i]nscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been
affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control,
or origin." 28'1 Because an e-mail address may include a company's
trademark or trade name, the address might authenticate the entire
message. 282 For this reason, at least one district court has ruled that
e-mail messages can be self-authenticated under Rule 902.283
However, because the court did not explain in detail why the e-mail
277. 235 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000).
278. Id. at 1321-22.
279. Id. For instance, when the e-mail recipient replied to the message, the
reply function "automatically dialed [the defendant's] e-mail address as the
sender." Id. at 1321; see also Robins, supra note 174, at 230 (describing
Siddiqui as "[a] good example of how e-mail messages can be authenticated in
accordance with Rule 901 (b)(4).").
280. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1322.
281. FED. R. EvID. 902(7).
282. See Robins, supra note 174, at 240-43 (analogizing a return address to
a trade inscription and suggesting that an address may be sufficient to make the
message "self-authenticating").
283. See Superhighway Consulting, Inc. v. Techwave, Inc., No. 98 CV 5502,
1999 WL 1044870, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) (denying plaintiff's "motion
in limine to bar defendant Techwave from offering unauthenticated [e-mail]
evidence," the court shifted the burden of proving e-mails were not self-
authenticating to plaintiff at trial).
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messages were sufficiently self-authenticating, it is difficult to
determine whether a return address alone would be sufficient.284
b. Hearsay is a much higher hurdle
As discussed above, courts hesitate to apply the business records
exception to e-mail messages. 285 For example, the Ninth Circuit in
Monotype Corp. v. International Typeface Corporation ("ITC")
286
held that an e-mail message was inadmissible under the business
records exception because it was not kept in the regular course of
business.28 7 A Microsoft employee sent the message in question to
his superior, voicing his concerns about potential infringement of an
ITC copyright.288 ITC argued that the court should admit the
message because e-mail messages to superiors at Microsoft were
records kept in the regular course of business. 28 9 However, the court
determined that e-mail was "far less of a systematic business activity
than a monthly inventory printout.' '29° Moreover, the court noted
that "[e]-mail is an ongoing electronic message and retrieval system
whereas an electronic inventory recording system is a regular,
284. Id. at *2. But see Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a trade inscription on the cover of an automobile
owner's manual did not render the manual admissible under Rule 902(7)).
285. See supra Part VI.E.l.a. For a thorough overview of e-mail and the
business records exception, see Anthony J. Dreyer, Note, When the Postman
Beeps Twice: The Admissibility of Electronic Mail Under the Business Records
Exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2285
(1996). Dreyer argues that e-mail is a "hybrid of computer-based records and
correspondence, both of which may be admitted under FRE 803(6)." Id. at
2287. He also notes that while not all e-mail messages would qualify as
business records, e-mail, as it is used by many organizations, satisfies the
requirements and policies behind the rule. Id. at 2287, 2314-27. Moreover, he
argues that a change in the Rules of Evidence "is necessary to provide a clear
mandate as to the appropriate treatment of e-mail evidence." Id. at 2287; see
also Givens, supra note 9, at 111-12 (noting that, despite commentator's pleas
and the widespread use of e-mail, courts have been reluctant to accept e-mail
messages into evidence as business records).
286. 43 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 1994).
287. Id. at 450.
288. Id. The potential copyright violations at issue involved a typeface. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
1784
Summer 2005] ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE & FEDERAL RULES 1785
systematic function of a bookkeeper prepared in the course of
business." 
29 1
In rejecting another series of e-mails between the defendant
Microsoft and a competitor firm, a District of Columbia court drew
further distinction between records kept in the course of business and
the regular practice of sending e-mail messages.292 In New York v.
Microsoft Corp., an employee of Microsoft's competitor wrote an e-
mail message wherein he referred to a particular phone call with
Microsoft representatives.2 93 The court concluded that while this e-
mail may have been kept in the course of regularly conducted
business activity, the competitor firm did not establish that it was the
regular practice of employees to write such messages.
2 94
In Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States,295 the Court of
Federal Claims concluded that e-mail messages "recounting
telephone or hallway conversations or offering curbside opinions are
too informal," and hence, inadmissible under the business records
exception.296 The court also noted that business records made
systematically "reflect a higher 'probability of trustworthiness,'
297
but "documents that are created solely at the author's discretion raise
291. Id. The court in Monotype distinguished United States v. Catabran, 836
F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1988), where the Ninth Circuit held that computer
printouts were admissible under the business records exception once the
proponent had laid a proper foundation. Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450. Notably,
the Monotype court's discussion did not go beyond this technical distinction to
consider the content or context of the message. Id. At least one commentator
has criticized the Ninth Circuit's "perfunctory" application of the exception,
noting the court's reasoning was inconsistent with evidence offered by the
proponent which showed that this type of e-mail report was a regular activity
for employees. Dreyer, supra note 285, at 2317.
291. Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450.
292. New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233 (CKK), 2002 WL
649951 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002).
293. Id. at *2.
294. Id.
295. 55 Fed. Cl. 544 (2003).
296. Id. app. at 566.
297. Id.; see also Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943) (holding
that an engineer's accident report was not "typical of entries made
systematically or as a matter of routine," and hence, there was a lower
"probability of trustworthiness").
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motivational concerns and lack the reliability and trustworthiness
that business records are ordinarily assumed to have."
298
Notwithstanding this line of cases, some e-mail messages may
qualify as business records under Rule 803(6). Although the court in
New York v. Microsoft Corp. rejected an e-mail message offered as
evidence, it noted in dicta that its decision did not imply that no e-
mail could qualify as a "business record." 299 For instance, if the
foundational witness can establish that employees regularly keep e-
mail memos of meetings or phone calls, then the business record
exception may be satisfied.3 °° In addition, at least one district court
has held that e-mail messages are admissible under the hearsay
exception when they are kept in the normal course of business and
created at or near the time of the matters described therein. 30 1 E-mail
purchase orders or automatic sales confirmation messages, for
example, may be admissible under Rule 803(6).
Beyond the business records exception, proponents may find
other ways to offer e-mail as evidence. For instance, an e-mail
message may not be hearsay if the proponent offers it against the
party who made the "statement." 30 2 Moreover, an e-mail message
sent in the context of a business transaction might be admissible
under another Rule 803 exception to the hearsay rule. Although
singular in its approach to e-mail as hearsay, the Ferber case
discussed below is nonetheless a valuable illustration of the potential
admissibility of e-mail evidence.
30 3
298. Westfed, 55 Fed. CI. at 566 (citations omitted); see also In re Hechinger
Investment Co. of Del., Inc., 298 B.R. 240, 242 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (holding
that e-mail messages did not fall within the business records exception because
they were direct responses to a solicitation for information and were made in
preparation for the bankruptcy proceeding).
299. New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233 (CKK), 2002 WL
649951, at *2, n.4 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002).
300. Id.
301. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 (D.S.C. 2004)
(noting that, although this was a close question, the declaration of the
company's custodian of records, together with the affidavit of a paralegal who
received copies of the records on compact disk, satisfied the business records
exception).
302. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). In general, a statement is not hearsay if it
is offered against a party and it is the party's own statement.
303. See infra Part VI.E. 1.b.ii.
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i. Party admission
A few courts have allowed e-mail messages into evidence as
non-hearsay party admissions, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2).3 °4 On
appeal, the defendant in Siddiqui challenged the government's use of
e-mail messages he sent to a colleague, on grounds that the messages
were improperly authenticated and they constituted inadmissible
hearsay. 30 5 At trial, however, the defendant objected only to the
government's authentication.306 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that if the defendant had properly preserved his hearsay objection,
the district court would still have been within its discretion to
overrule the objection. 30 7 In particular, the court concluded that the
e-mail messages would have been party admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(A) and would therefore have been admissible as non-
hearsay. 30 8
In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Lozen International, LLC,3 °9 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court improperly excluded
an e-mail message authored by one Sea-Land employee and
forwarded to Lozen by a second Sea-Land employee. 310 The lower
court found that Lozen did not present any evidence indicating the
identity or job title of the employee who authored the e-mail. 311 But
304. Rule 801(d)(2) exempts "five categories of statements for which the
responsibility of a party is considered sufficient to justify reception in evidence
against him." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
Specifically, a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is
(A) the party's own statement in either an individual or representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person
authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(2).
305. United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
306. Id. at 1323.
307. Id.
308. Id. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay
if it "is offered against a party.., and is the party's own statement in either an
individual or a representative capacity."
309. 285 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2002).
310. Id. at 821.
311. Id.
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the Ninth Circuit, accepting Lozen's argument on appeal, held that
the message was not hearsay because it was a statement by the
party's agent, concerning a matter within the scope of his
employment. 3 12 Because Rule 801 provides that the contents of the
statement itself may be considered, but are not sufficient, to establish
the scope of the employment relationship, the court also considered
the electronic "signature" attached to the message and the author's
role in the company.313 The e-mail message also constituted an
adoptive admission under 801(d)(2)(B) because a second Sea-Land
employee copied the original message and forwarded it to Lozen.3
14
This second employee was working for Sea-Land at the time the
message was written, and the contents of the e-mail were also within
the scope of her employment.
315
In Riisna v. ABC, Inc.,3 16 a court in the Southern District of New
York admitted an e-mail message sent by an executive producer to
Riisna, a freelance journalist. ABC, Inc. fired Riisna after she filed a
malpractice suit against a plastic surgeon featured on the network's
program "20/20., 3 17 Even though she retained a freelance position,
Riisna filed an age discrimination suit against the network.318
Shortly thereafter, she received an e-mail from an executive producer
stating that her freelance project "[wasn't] going to [work]31
9
out .... 320 Riisna sought to enter the producer's e-mail as evidence
of the network's retaliatory scheme. 32 ' The district court held that
the e-mail was a party admission because the producer was acting
312. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
313. Sea-Land Serv. Inc., 285 F.3d at 821 (noting that the author was a
service coordinator at Sea-Land at the time the e-mail was written and the
message concerned a late delivery to Lozen).
314. Id. The second employee incorporated the first e-mail in her message
to Lozen and prefaced it with the statement, "Yikes, Pls note the rail screwed
us up..." Id.
315. Id.
316. 219 F. Supp. 2d 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
317. Id. at 570. While producing a story for the network's program "20/20,"
Ene Riisna met a plastic surgeon who later performed surgery on Riisna's face.
Upset with the surgical outcome, Riisna sued the surgeon for medical
malpractice. Id.
318. Id.
319. Brackets in original.
320. Id. at 571.
321. Id. at 571-72.
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within the scope of his employment,32 2 and he was authorized by
ABC to make a statement concerning the company's refusal to re-
hire Riisna.
323
ii. Other exceptions
In United States v. Ferber,324 a Massachusetts district court
considered whether an e-mail message fell within a number of other
exceptions to the hearsay rule.325 No federal court since Ferber has
undertaken such a comprehensive analysis of e-mail statements
under the hearsay rule. Nevertheless, this case illustrates the
potential for proponents to offer e-mail evidence without first having
to satisfy the requirements of the business records exception. For
instance, a proponent could offer an e-mail message as a "present
sense impression," without first demonstrating that the message was
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.
326
Ferber, a financial advisor and investment banker, was convicted
for violating fiduciary duties he owed to his public entity clients.
327
The court explained a number of its evidentiary rulings in this case,
including the admission of an incriminating e-mail message. 328 After
a telephone conversation with Ferber, Carey sent this message to his
supervisor at Merrill Lynch,329 describing Ferber's inculpatory
322. Id. at 572; see FED. R. EvlD. 801(d)(2)(D).
323. Riisna, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 572; see FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(C).
324. 966 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997).
325. Id. at 98-99; see also Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr.,
261 F.3d 512, 527 (2001) (noting that an e-mail sent by a university president
after a jury found the university liable in a harassment suit would be admissible
on a number of grounds, including Rule 803(3), as a statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind; however, the court's discussion was
cursory, and it did not explain why this particular message fit within the
hearsay exception).
326. Compare id. 803(6) with FED. R. EvID. 803(1), which exempts from the
hearsay rule any "statement describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter." For a discussion of hearsay exceptions in the context
of non-electronic evidence and state court cases involving e-mail evidence, see
Robins, supra note 174.
327. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 92.
328. Id. at 98-99.
329. One of Ferber's clients, the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
("MWRA"), selected Merrill Lynch as underwriter for a bond issue. Id. at 93.
The government alleged that Ferber aided Merrill Lynch during the
underwriter selection process, in violation of the MWRA's "blackout rule,"
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statements. 330  Carey ended the e-mail by saying, "my mind is
mush!"
33 1
The government first sought to admit the message as a business
record, by demonstrating that it was Carey's routine practice to send
messages to co-workers in the "relevant 'loop' immediately
following an important telephone conversation with a client." 332 The
court, however, rejected this foundation because there was
insufficient evidence that Merrill Lynch required such records be
maintained.333 Without a duty to keep this type of record, the
government could not demonstrate its reliability.
334
The government then tried to admit the e-mail as an excited
utterance under Rule 803(2), based on Carey's final comment, "my
mind is mush!, 335 To lay the foundation for this exception, the
government called Carey to testify that that he wrote the e-mail
shortly after his conversation with Ferber, when he was "very upset"
and "panicked. 336  The court rejected this argument as well.337
Based on the detail and length of Carey's message, and the
possibility that he spoke with someone else before writing it, the
court concluded that Carey had ample time to reflect, and hence was
no longer influenced by the "stress of excitement" caused by his
conversation with Ferber.
338
The government ultimately succeeded in admitting Carey's
e-mail message as a present sense impression under Rule 803(1).
339
The court noted that while a present sense impression "is admissible
so long as it explains an event immediately after it happens," the
passage of a short amount of time does not necessarily preclude the
which prohibited investment banks from contacting any agent of the MWRA
during the election process. Id.
330. Id. at 98.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.; see also supra note 274 and accompanying text.
335. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99. FED. R. EvID. 803(2) exempts from the
hearsay rule a "statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition."
336. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99.
337. Id.
338. Id.; see FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
339. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99; see FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
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evidence.340 Thus, the court concluded that "although Carey's e-mail
was removed from the 'stress' of the Ferber phone call, it was
prepared shortly afterward and therefore qualified as a present sense
impression.
'" 34
1
2. Internet Evidence: Foundational Issues
Courts view Internet evidence with skepticism, primarily
because it can be altered by anyone with access to a Web site server.
At least one district court has stated that a proponent of Internet
evidence cannot "overcome the presumption that the information he
discovered on the Internet is inherently untrustworthy." 342 This same
court went on to say that it held "no illusions that hackers can
adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at any
time," and thus "any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate
for almost nothing."
343
While this may seem like an overly harsh stance against Internet
evidence, a similar position was taken by the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Jackson.344  There, the circuit court echoed the
district court's distrust of Internet evidence 345 and concluded that
340. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99 (citing United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d
779, 785 (7th Cir. 1979) for the proposition that statements made within
twenty-three minutes of an event are admissible under 803(1)); see also FED.
R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee's note ("[I]n many, if not most, instances
precise contemporaneity is not possible, and hence a slight lapse is
allowable.").
341. Ferber, 966 F.Supp. at 99.
342. St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774
(S.D. Tex. 1999).
343. Id. at 775. This court, referring to "voodoo information taken from the
Internet," summarized its skepticism toward Internet evidence: "While some
look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the Court
continues to warily and wearily view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor,
innuendo, and misinformation." Id. at 774-75.
344. 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 253-256 and
accompanying text.
345. Jackson, 208 F.3d. at 637 (quoting St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 775).
For the proposition that internet evidence is inherently untrustworthy, St. Clair
has been cited by a number of federal district courts. E.g., United States
EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. Civ. A 03-1605, 2004 WL
2347559, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004); Tolliver v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria,
265 F. Supp. 2d 873, 876 (W.D. Mich. 2003); Wady v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co. of America, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
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Web site postings were inadmissible as business records of internet
service providers because the defendant presented no evidence that
the "service providers even monitored the contents of those web
sites."
346
Because of inherent reliability concerns, authentication of
Internet evidence, in contrast to other forms of electronic evidence, is
problematic. For instance, the Jackson court ruled that even if Web
postings were admissible hearsay, the evidence still lacked
authentication under Rule 901.347 The defendant needed to show that
the Web postings were actually posted by the groups that operated
the sites, "as opposed to being slipped onto the groups' web sites by
[the defendant] herself, who was a skilled computer user."348 The
untrustworthiness of Internet evidence may also be reflected in the
fact that nearly all reported cases on point-excluding Jackson-
have been decided at the district court level.349  Thus, the
inadmissibility of Internet evidence remains a non-controversial
issue among federal courts. Interestingly, however, district courts
have declined to follow the authentication and hearsay analyses of
Jackson and St. Clair. In particular, courts that have addressed the
hearsay rule have distinguished Internet evidence generated by a
party's Web site from that of non-parties. When offered from a
party's Web site (and against that party), the evidence constitutes a
party admission and thus is admissible as non-hearsay.
350
Westland Water Dist. v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1143 n.9 (E.D.
Cal. 2001); Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 760 n.3 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
346. Jackson, 208 F.3d at 637.
347. Id. at 638.
348. Id. This supports the notion that courts should analyze both
authentication and the applicability of a hearsay exception. Nevertheless, this
ruling runs counter to the line of cases previously discussed, wherein
proponents could easily satisfy both authentication and hearsay analyses by
fulfilling the requirements of the latter. See supra Part VI.C.2.
349. See supra note 345.
350. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). In so holding, courts side-step the issues
of authenticity, reliability and trustworthiness. In fact, one district court noted
that where "technical deficiencies" of Internet evidence exist, they "must go to
the weight of such evidence, rather than to their admissibility." Microware
Systems Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 n.2 (S.D.
Iowa 2000) (citing Squirt Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir.
1980)).
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In Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp.,351 the
plaintiffs sued a debt collection agency for violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.35 In a collection letter, the
defendants invited plaintiffs to view the collection agency's Web
site.353 The plaintiffs then sought to admit the Web site content as
evidence of the defendants' misrepresentations. 354 The defendants
argued that the Web site constituted inadmissible hearsay, but the
Oregon district court ruled that the contents of the site were not
hearsay because they were representations made by the defendants
and offered into evidence by the plaintiffs.355
A California district court held the same when the plaintiff
offered into evidence a report submitted by the defendant to the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 356 This report was
filed with the SEC and later posted on the Internet.357 The defendant
objected to the admission of the reports on the ground that they were
hearsay, but the court ruled that because the reports were submitted
by the defendant (and the defendant did not offer any evidence to the
contrary), they constituted a party admission. 358 The court also noted
that the act of placing the SEC reports on the Internet was non-verbal
conduct, not intended as an assertion, and therefore could not be
hearsay under Rule 801. 9  In addition, the court rejected the
defendant's contention that, under St. Clair and Jackson,360 the Web
site material should be barred.361 The court concluded that Jackson
351. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (D. Or. 2000).
352. Id. at 1094.
353. Id. at 1109.
354. Id. at 1095.
355. Id.; see also Telewizia Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No.
02 C 3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (holding that
contents of plaintiff's Web site were an admission of party-opponent and thus
not barred by the hearsay rule).
356. Fla. Conference Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Kyriakides, 151 F.
Supp. 2d 1223, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
357. Id.
358. Id. Defendant also raised an authenticity objection. But the court, in a
footnote, rejected that argument because the "context in which Plaintiff
obtained the documents as well as the content and appearance of the
documents" indicated they were authentic. Id. at 1225 n.3.
359. Id. at 1225. Under FED. R. EviD. 801(a)(2), nonverbal conduct may be
a "statement" if it is intended by the declarant as an assertion.
360. See supra notes 342-346 and accompanying text.
361. Kyriakides, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
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and St. Clair were inapposite because, in those cases, statements
posted on Web sites were statements by non-parties and hence were
inadmissible hearsay.
362
Another California district court determined that when a party
offers the content of its own Web site into evidence, that evidence is
admissible based on "circumstantial indicia of authenticity. '" 363 In
Perfect 10, the court considered the admissibility of exhibits printed
from the plaintiff's Web site.364 The defendant, citing Jackson and
St. Clair, argued that the exhibits were insufficiently
authenticated. 365 The court noted that while these two "out-of-circuit
cases are informative concerning the potential pitfalls of internet-
based documents, [the] court must look to the Ninth Circuit for
guidance." 366  The court then cited United States v. Tank3 67 and
concluded that circumstantial evidence supported the admissibility of
the Internet printouts. 368  In particular, the court relied on a
declaration of the plaintiffs CEO that the printouts were true and
correct copies of pages printed from the Internet by the CEO himself
or under his direction. 3 9 The court also concluded that, in concert
with the dates and Web addresses on the printouts, a reasonable juror
could believe that the documents were what the plaintiff
purported.37 °
F. Best Evidence
The third obstacle to the admission of electronic evidence is the
rule of best evidence. When a party seeks to "prove the content of a
362. Id.
363. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
364. Id. at 1153-54.
365. Id. at 1153.
366. Id. In this court's opinion, the St. Clair court "took a more extreme
view over the admissibility of data" taken from the Internet. Id.
367. United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000); see supra
notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
368. Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
369. Id.
370. Id. Defendant also raised a hearsay objection to printouts from third-
party Web sites. However, the court concluded that, based on the defendant's
corporate affiliation with the third-party, the printouts fell outside the
definition of hearsay and thus were admissible as statements of party-
opponents under Rule 801 (d)(2)(D). Id. at 1155.
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writing, recording, or photograph," the Federal Rules require use of
the original, or in some circumstances a "duplicate." 371 Electronic
evidence falls within the ambit of the rule because "'[w]ritings' [or]
'recordings' consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent,
set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing... or other form of
data compilation.' 372 A proponent need not introduce a hard drive,
disk or other electronic hardware because the Rules also provide that
"[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or
other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately,
is an 'original'. 373 For instance, in Perfect 10, the court noted that
to the extent printouts were used to demonstrate the images and text
found on the Web site, the printouts were subject to-and met-the
best evidence rule.
374
1. Graphical Representation
While best evidence seems a relatively straightforward
requirement, problems arise when the primary purpose of the data is
to create a visual representation. A recent federal appellate case is
illustrative. In United States v. Bennett,375 the issue was whether a
customs officer's testimony about global positioning satellite
("GPS") display data was barred by the best evidence 
rule.376
Although the officer did not see the defendant's boat cross the border
between Mexico and the United States, the officer did observe the
display on a GPS device discovered during a search of that 
boat.377
The officer testified that the display showed navigational points from
waters off the coast of Mexico to points north of San Diego 
Bay. 378
371. FED. R. EvID. 1002. Under Rule 1003, "[a] duplicate is admissible to
the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to
admit the duplicate in lieu of the original." Id. 1003.
372. Id. 1001(1) (emphasis added). According to the Advisory Committee's
note, "the considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion to include
computers, photographic systems, and other modem developments." Id. 1001
advisory committee's note.
373. Id. 100 1(3) (emphasis added).
374. 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 n.4.
375. 363 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2004).
376. Id. at 952-53.
377. See id. at 952.
378. Id.
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At trial, the district court overruled the defendant's best
evidence objection, 379 but the Ninth Circuit noted that the rule
applies when a witness "seeks to testify about the contents of a
writing, recording or photograph without producing the physical item
itself., 380 Because the government was "not excused from the best
evidence rule's preference for the original," and because "the
government did not produce the GPS itself.., or a printout or other
representation of [the] data," the Ninth Circuit held the officer's
testimony was inadmissible.
381
2. "Hidden" Information and the Integrity
of Electronic Evidence
Further problems arise when a hard copy printout or other data
output does not reflect all of the data that might be needed to
adequately present the evidence in its electronic context. While a
computer printout of electronically stored data and the "actual
electronic file may contain the same visible words [or] thoughts," the
electronic file may include other "hidden" information. 382 in
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President,383 the District of
Columbia Circuit described "hidden" information in e-mail
messages:384
[B]oth the recipient and the author of a note can print out a
"hard copy" of the electronic message containing
essentially all the information displayed on the computer
screen. That paper rendering will not, however, necessarily
include all the information held in the computer memory as
part of the electronic document. Directories, distribution
lists, acknowledgments of receipts and similar materials do
not appear on the computer screen-and thus are not
reproduced when users print out the information that
appears on the screen. Without this "non-screen"
information, a later reader may not be able to glean from the
379. Id.
380. Id. at 953-54. According to the court, the best evidence rule applies
"particularly when the witness [is] not privy to the events those contents
describe." Id.
381. Id. at 954.
382. Givens, supra note 9, at 98.
383. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
384. Id. at 1280.
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hard copy such basic facts as who sent or received a
particular message or when it was received....
Consequently, if only the hard copy is preserved in such
situations, essential transmittal information relevant to a
fuller understanding of the context and import of an
electronic communication will simply vanish.38
In this case, the court held that administrative agencies of the
federal government did not fulfill their duties under the Federal
Records Act ("FRA") 386 by simply printing copies of electronic
messages and managing the "hard copy" documents in accordance
with the Act.387 Although the Armstrong court did not specifically
address the evidentiary value of these messages, a few courts have
addressed the utility of electronic evidence vis-A-vis its completeness
and integrity.388 These courts have considered electronic data in
visual and audio formats and, notably, they have not followed
Armstrong's reasoning.
389
In United States v. Sattar,390 for example, a New York district
court held that the production of intercepted evidence in a file format
different from the original did not violate the best evidence rule.
391
The defendant argued that electronic surveillance evidence was
inadmissible because the government provided the audio files in an
.mp3 format rather than in their original file format.392 He argued
that the "deletion or non-disclosure of the [original] underlying...
file formats amount[ed] to destruction of the original evidence for
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1278 (citing the FRA at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-19, 2901-10, 3101-
07, and 3301-24 (2001)).
387. Id. at 1277, 1296; see also Public Citizen v. Carlin, 184 F.3d 900, 911
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (" '[U]nless the paper versions include all significant material
contained in the electronic records.., the two documents cannot be accurately
termed 'copies."' (quoting Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1283)).
388. See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510435,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111
F. Supp. 2d 294, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
389. It may be that any loss of data is less perceptible when electronic or
digital information is used in audio-visual formats. For instance, in Universal
City Studios, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 313-14, the court noted that the loss of
data from decompression of a visual file resulted in an imperceptible loss of
quality, that would be "of no importance to ordinary consumers."
390. No. 02 CR. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003).
391. See id. at *4.
392. Id. at *1.
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purposes of the best evidence rule." 393  The court, denying the
defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing, held that there was
"no reason to believe that the file format... fail[ed] to maintain the
[original] files'.., fidelity, or that it compresse[d] or destroy[ed] the
data." 394 Moreover, the court stated that the defendant made "no
showing that the underlying electronic files contained [any]
exculpatory evidence or that the [g]overnment deleted the files in bad
faith.
,,395
Although federal courts have not determined the best evidence
implications of data compression, at least one intellectual property
case suggests that it may not have any effect on the actual content of
electronic files or the integrity of the evidence.396 In Universal City
Studios, Inc., the district court determined that use of a software
application to compress and then decompress movies on digital
versatile disks ("DVDs") infringed movie copyrights, even though
the compression involved an inexact replication of the original
file.3 97  Similarly, an inexact "duplicate" of electronic data with
audiovisual output may suffice as an "original" under the best
evidence rule.
3. Summaries
A few federal courts have addressed the use of computer
generated summaries under Rule 1006, which provides that the
contents of a "voluminous" writing or recording "which cannot
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a
chart, summary, or calculation."'3 98 In AFD Fund v. United States,
399
a Court of Federal Claims set forth four requirements for the use of a
summary of evidence:
393. Id. at *4.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Data compression has been defined as "the process of reducing the size
of the representation of a string of electronic data in order to permit it to be
transmitted or stored more efficiently and later to be reconstructed without
error." Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 498, 501
(D. Mass. 1997).
397. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
398. FED. R. EVID. 1006. The rule also provides that the "originals, or
duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by
other parties at reasonable time and place." Id.
399. 61 Fed. Cl. 540 (2004).
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First, the summarized writings must be so voluminous so as
to be unable to be conveniently examined in court. Second,
the underlying evidence must itself be admissible. Third,
the original or copies of the summarized writings must be
made available to the opposing party. And, fourth, the
proposed summary (or chart or calculation) must accurately
summarize (or reflect) the underlying document(s) and only
the underlying document(s).4 ° °
In United States v. King,401 the Third Circuit held that the
government's charts and exhibits summarizing electronic
communications between conspirators in a drug distribution ring
402were admissible. Specifically, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted the summaries because the government
was able to "establish that all of the telephone and beeper numbers
on the charts and exhibits were controlled by [the defendant] or his
associates. ' 4°3 Moreover, the government accurately explained the
charts and exhibits to the jury.
404
Interestingly, while it is no trouble for a proponent to show that
a summary accurately represents the underlying electronic
information,40 5 the third requirement that the underlying evidence be
made available to the opposing party has been more problematic.
For instance, in AFD Fund, the court determined that "AFD did not
provide [a] complete set of electronic files to the government,
including copies of the electronic [records] used to generate
400. Id. at 546; see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 241,
244-45 (2003) (discussing the admissibility of a summary of evidence in
federal court and these four foundational requirements); Bath Iron Works
Corp. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 218, 232-33 (1995) (discussing the same).
401. 93 Fed. Appx. 490 (3d Cir. 2004). This is one of a series of cases
decided by the Third Circuit in April 2004, involving drug conspiracies and
summaries of electronic communications. See United States v. Worrells, 94
Fed. Appx. 927, 929 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a summary was admissible
when the government explained the summary "so as not to confuse the jury");
United States v. Watson, 93 Fed. Appx. 481, 482 (3d Cir. 2004).
402. King, 93 Fed. Appx. at 491-92.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 492.
405. The inaccuracy of the summary itself, like other electronic evidence,
goes to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility. See BD ex rel.
Jean Doe v. DeBuono, 193 F.R.D. 117, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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406
invoices" and account summaries. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in
Hughes v. United States40 7 held that IRS certificates were admissible
to show that the defendants owed federal income taxes.40 8 The
defendants argued that the forms were inadmissible under Rule 1006
"because neither the originals nor duplicates of the original
assessment documents [had] been made available." 40 9 The court,
however, held that this argument was misplaced because the forms
were not merely a summary record of the proof, but rather were
themselves proof that the IRS made the tax assessments.410
Finally, video summaries may be analogous to electronic
sources in audio or visual format, such as digital images or DVDs.41'
In Miracle Blade, LLC v. Ebrands Commerce Group, LLC,4 12 a seller
of kitchen knives sued a competitor for copyright and trademark
infringement based on a series of infomercials.413  To prove no
infringement, the defendants sought to admit a video summary of the
infomercials in question.414  The court held that although the
defendants "did not comply with [Rule] 1006 to the letter," the
summary was nevertheless admissible given the "unique exigencies"
of the case.415 In particular, the court determined that "presenting
each comparison infomercial in its entirety would have been an
inconvenience for the court to examine. 416  Moreover, the
defendants sufficiently identified the source of the video excerpts,
and the plaintiff had access to the material at least ten days prior to
the hearing.4 17 To date, no reported federal case involves the use of
summaries of electronic evidence in audio or visual format.
406. AFD Fund v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 540, 546 (2004). AFD did not
attempt to satisfy the other requirements of the rule since it denied that the
evidence proffered constituted summaries. Id.
407. 953 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1992).
408. Id. at 539-40.
409. Id. at 539.
410. Id. at 540.
411. See supra notes 396-397 and accompanying text (discussing
compression and decomoression of data on DVDs).
412. 207 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Nev. 2002).
413. Id. at 1141.
414. See id. at 1145-46.
415. Id. at 1146. The court did not explain how the defendants failed to
comply with Rule 1006.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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Nevertheless, cases like Miracle Blade illustrate the challenges that
arise when a proponent seeks to admit electronic evidence.
G. New Frontiers of Electronic Evidence
Application of the Federal Rules to electronic evidence is still,
to some degree, speculative. As forms of electronic communication
and recordkeeping develop, the courts' interpretations of the Rules
will also evolve. If the past is an indicator, this area of law will
continue to advance at the district court level without much
controversy: courts will become increasingly sophisticated and well-
versed in handling electronic evidence, and the trend of assimilation
of electronic evidence into the realm of real evidence will continue.
In this case, electronic evidence will be the "best friend" of its
proponents.
However, as electronic technology evolves, so too do the
opportunities for manipulation of data. What now seems to be a
healthy skepticism toward e-mail and the Internet may become a
broader distrust on the part of courts. Only time will tell whether
electronic evidence will push the evidentiary envelope so far that
courts will no longer admit such evidence under the Rules as they
exist today. In that case, textual revisions to the Rules may be
necessary. Whatever the trend, litigators will undoubtedly face more
and more evidence in electronic form, and they must be prepared to
meet evidentiary hurdles with technological savvy and creativity.
1802 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1745
